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SO YOU WANT TO BE AN AUTHOR:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE AUTHORIAL RIGHTS
AWARDED TO PERFORMERS
DANIEL GOMEZ†
INTRODUCTION
In his classic 1980 song “On the Road Again,” Willie Nelson
articulates that “the life [he] love[s] is making music with [his]
friends.”1 This affinity for the life of a traveling performer likely
has little to do with his authorial rights under the Copyright
Act.2 However, as this Note demonstrates, Mr. Nelson indeed
benefited from favorable authorial rights when compared to other
types of performers, beyond the rights he acquired as the song’s
writer. Specifically, the current law around the default authorial
rights of performers provides greater protection to performers of
sound recordings than it affords to visual and audiovisual
performers.3
Intellectual property scholar Justin Hughes has explored
this differential in copyright authorial protections in what he labeled a “[t]hought [e]xperiment[ ].”4 In his experiment, Hughes
compared the authorial protections afforded to musicians with
those afforded to actors while minimizing all other creative contributions to the point of nullity.5 This Note seeks to expand on
†

Staff Member, St. John’s Law Review, J.D., 2020, St. John’s University School
of Law; B.S., 2018, St. John’s University.
1
WILLIE NELSON, On the Road Again, on HONEYSUCKLE ROSE (Columbia
Records 1980).
2
Michael Hall, Why Does Willie Nelson Still Do It?, TEXAS MONTHLY (Apr. 18,
2018), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/why-does-willie-nelson-still-do-it/
[https://perma.cc/6JEL-NHT6].
3
For the purposes of this Note, I have limited my analysis to the protections
afforded to musical artists compared to those of photograph subjects and actors.
4
Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 36–39 (2019).
5
Id. Hughes notes that the reasoning of the legislative history to the 1976
Copyright Act was that in cases where a sound recording’s producer contributes
minimally to the sound recording, the performer of the sound recording is given
authorship. Id. at 37–38. Further, Hughes argues that the same protection should be
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Hughes’s thought experiment. Namely, it examines the law surrounding the default authorial rights of photographic subjects,
actors, and musicians. This examination demonstrates that both
actors and photographic subjects receive disproportionately minimal authorial recognition when compared to musicians. This
Note then argues that the minimal default authorial protection
afforded to actors and photographic subjects does not honor their
labor rights. Further, it argues that the best way to correct the
discrepancies between the authorial rights awarded to performers in these different fields is to expansively apply the doctrine of
joint authorship.
Part I of this Note addresses how creative labor actually occurs in performance settings, how default protection is disparately awarded within these performance settings, and why
protecting performers’ creative contributions is important. Part
II discusses possible copyright vehicles that are relevant to the
issue of authorial rights of performers. That Part looks at the
doctrines of work for hire, joint authorship, and implied licenses.
Finally, Part III explains why an amended joint authorship
doctrine would be the most helpful doctrine to equalize the
authorship rights of performers and also addresses some counterarguments against allowing performers to be protected as joint
authors.
I. CREATIVE LABOR AND THE
PROBLEM OF DISPARATE PROTECTION
A.

Creative Labor in Performance Settings

1.

Photography

In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme
Court of the United States provided some instruction as to how
creative labor is carried out in the context of photography.6
There, the Court highlighted that the photographer’s creative
contribution was so pervasive that it warranted granting authorship rights over a photograph.7 Indeed, courts have identified

afforded to an actor who performs a Shakespearean soliloquy if all other creative
contributions can be reduced. Id. at 39.
6
111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
7
Id. at 60.
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three ways photographers contribute originality to photographic
works: “rendition,” “timing,” and “creation of the subject.”8
Originality in rendition is the creative labor that the photographer employs without regard to the subject or the setting of the
photo—aspects such as lighting, angles, and developing techniques.9 Undoubtedly, photographers often have specialized
knowledge and skills.10 This may include specialized skills in the
effective use of light, abstract forms, and special equipment; or it
may involve specialized knowledge of art more generally.11
Originality in timing is the photographer’s being in the “right
place at the right time.”12 This highlights the photographer’s creative labor in choosing just when and where to snap a picture.13
Finally, creation of the subject is the photographer’s creative
labor of setting the scene or subject in a precise way.14 This
originality applies to the photographer’s special artistic vision
that the subject could not contribute on his or her own.15 These
contributions are clearly important in producing a valuable
photograph.
However, these points of originality ignore the fact that the
photographer is not the sole contributor to a photograph. Indeed,
the art of photography is collaborative, requiring cooperation
from the photographer and the photographic subject. This reality
means that, oftentimes, the value of a photograph is not solely a
product of the photographer’s artfulness, but rather, of the contribution of the subject involved.16 Notably, a spontaneous, creative
8

Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 452.
10
See Ming Thein, What Makes a Good Photographer?, MING THEIN: BLOG (Feb.
9, 2013), https://blog.mingthein.com/2013/02/09/what-makes-a-good-photographer/
[https://perma.cc/L9NY-RANY].
11
Id.
12
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53.
13
Id. at 453.
14
Id.
15
Benjamin Falk’s description of his methods demonstrates this artistic vision.
He would “make the subject so forget his surroundings as to mentally assume the
part or character to be represented in the picture” and use curtains and lights to
bring out the intended effects. Eva E. Subotnik, The Author Was Not an Author: The
Copyright Interests of Photographic Subjects from Wilde to Garcia, 39 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 449, 456 (2016) (quoting Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 33 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893)).
The subject likely could not do this him or herself.
16
“It is perfectly clear that the object of such photographs is merely to have a
large public sale. This is accomplished not by the accessories of the pose of the party
photographed, but by the greater or less fame or notoriety which the subject of the
photograph has acquired.” Id. at 452 (quoting Statement and Brief for Plaintiff in
Error at 14, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (No. 1071)).
9

272

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:269

contribution from a subject, neither foreseen nor arranged by the
photographer, can sometimes become the most prevalent and
valuable creative addition to the photograph.17
For example, photographer Jim Marshall’s iconic picture of
Johnny Cash in San Quentin State Prison—pointing his middle
finger at the camera lens—is famous not because of masterful
arrangement from the photographer, but rather because Cash
opted to perform that gesture out of his own volition.18 Marshall
recounted that he told Cash “John, let’s do a shot for the warden,”
to which Cash responded by “flipp[ing] the camera the bird.”19
This spontaneous, though provoked, reaction from Cash was
more the product of his own creativity and not the careful
development of an artistic vision or originality in the creation of
the photographer. Marshall most certainly contributed creatively by being at the right time and place to take and provoke the
photograph; however, Cash also contributed creatively to the
photograph in choosing to pose in the iconic way he did. Indeed,
Cash’s independent creative contribution to the picture created
the photograph that Marshall described as “probably the most
ripped off photograph in the history of the world.”20 And yet, Cash
presumably received no copyright interest in the photograph.21
2.

Film

There are two prevailing views regarding the creative expression contributed by actors.22 The first is that actors only
follow the orders of a director and follow a script.23 Thus, they
contribute little or nothing creatively.24 Even if not a copyrightable contribution, however, an actor under this view does contribute to a film in his or her creative recitation of the words on the

17
See, e.g., Priya Elan, Johnny Cash Photographer Reveals Truth Behind San
Quentin Prison Shot, NME (Mar. 18, 2011, 1:04 PM), https://www.nme.com/news/
music/johnny-cash-19-1292708#Mw1zEKb1RV7FdRwC.99 [https://perma.cc/DWW6T34J].
18
Id. Admittedly, there may have been originality in the timing of the photographer. See supra text accompanying note 12. The iconic image may be found in an
article online. See Elan, supra note 17.
19
See Elan, supra note 17.
20
Id.
21
See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
22
See Hughes, supra note 4, at 41–43.
23
Id. at 42. Hughes describes this as “recitation or ‘recitation+’: recitation with
authenticity, recitation with sincerity,” and so on. Id.
24
Id. at 43.
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script.25 Though this seems to be the view taken by courts, as
discussed below, it may not be reflective of reality.26
A second view is that actors contribute a great deal
creatively to films, because their expressions, enunciations, and
accentuations help create strong or realistic characters and
strong emotional connections.27 This view comports with the idea
that “[t]he creative process of shooting a film is often more
collaborative with significant modifications contributed by the
actor.”28 These “modifications” can include actors adding expressive elements to characters that were not sought by the director,
like ad-libbed lines, pauses, inflections, or even tics.29 As discussed below, this view seems to acknowledge the realities of the
acting industry more effectively.30
For example, in Heath Ledger’s Oscar-winning performance
of the Joker in the movie The Dark Knight, Ledger adopted a
tongue tic in his performance that some describe as “[t]he most
identifiable characteristic” of the villain.31 However, this habit
was not a product of careful direction, but rather, a habit of
25
See id. at 48. “Nonetheless, one could still conclude that while ‘genuine human
creativity’ goes ‘into acting a script’ nonetheless ‘this creativity is different in kind
and in degree from the creativity that goes into creating the fixed, author-driven
works like literature and visual art.’ ” Id. (quoting Jacob M. Victor, Garcia v. Google
and a “Related Rights” Alternative to Copyright in Acting Performances, 124 YALE
L.J.F. 80, 86 (2014)).
26
Id. at 41 (“But no director has complete control over human actors, whether
they are acting in front of the camera, only lending their voices to CGI-created
cartoon characters, or merely operating marionettes. . . . [W]ithin the realm of what
a director can theoretically control, many directors cede substantial leeway to
actors.”).
27
Id. This is putting aside those works where an actor makes extra-acting contributions as well, such as ad-libbing lines or contributing to the script. Id. at 45–46.
28
Id. at 46.
29
See id. at 46–47.
30
See id. at 41, 46–49. Famous examples of actor-contributed modifications
include Heath Ledger’s choice to fidget with the remote detonator in the hospital
explosion scene in The Dark Night, where the script merely told him to walk away
from the explosion. See Paul Young, The 32 Greatest Unscripted Movie Scenes,
SCREEN RANT (Oct. 2, 2012), https://screenrant.com/greatest-unscripted-moviescenes/ [https://perma.cc/U8VA-QZWA]. Ledger’s contribution added “a slight
amount of dark humor to what would have just been a serious scene.” Id. Another
example is Dustin Hoffman’s iconic “I’m walkin’ here!” line in Midnight Cowboy
when a real New York City taxicab interrupted the film’s shooting. Id.
31
See Emily Zogbi, 7 Things You Didn’t Know About The Dark Night,
NEWSWEEK (July 18, 2018, 11:29 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/7-things-youdidnt-know-about-dark-knight-facts-1030256 [https://perma.cc/9YKJ-J7CA]; see also
THE DARK KNIGHT (Warner Bros. Pictures 2008); Heath Ledger, IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0005132/awards (last visited Oct. 14, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/2ZCJ-MM4E].
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Ledger’s addition.32 This “cannily menacing” gesture was actually Ledger’s effort to keep his prosthetics in place and an
exaggeration of a tic that Ledger had.33 Another example of the
collaborative interplay between actors and directors is the final
scene in the film Call Me by Your Name. In that scene, lead
actor Timothée Chalamet looks directly into the camera’s lenses
while crying over the loss of his first love.34 In the film’s
commentary, Chalamet describes this intimate, improvised
moment as a “little homage to Boyhood here at the end, stealing
a two-second look into the lens.”35 This moving moment in the
film is an example of an actor independently contributing creatively to a film. Chalamet contributed this powerful moment to
the film of his own accord; he was not carrying out a director’s
will, but rather he was apparently providing a moving allusion to
another film.36 And yet neither Ledger nor Chalamet presumably
received copyright interests in their respective films.
3.

Music

The traditional model for the creation of music involved an
initial composition process and a later performance process.37 In
the composition phase, a composer would engage in the “deliberative activity” of writing and retooling a musical score.38 This was
followed by the “unrepeatable” interpretive process of having a
musician, or group of musicians, perform that composed piece.39
Such a practice created a belief that the musicians were essentially conduits for the work and not necessarily creative
32

See Zogbi, supra note 31.
Estelle Tang, I Am Heath Ledger: A New Documentary Takes an Intimate
View of the Actor, ELLE (May 15, 2017), https://www.elle.com/culture/moviestv/news/a45267/i-am-heath-ledger-documentary/ [https://perma.cc/6AXT-EU45]; see
Shaheera Anwar, 5 Unknown Facts About Heath Ledger’s Joker, THE EXPRESS
TRIBUNE (Jan. 23, 2018), https://tribune.com.pk/story/1616036/4-5-unknown-factsheath-ledgers-joker [https://perma.cc/5Q8H-SS6H].
34
CALL ME BY YOUR NAME (Sony Pictures 2017).
35
San Vu, Call Me by Your Name Commentary Track[—]Timothée Chalamet &
Michael Stuhlbarg, YOUTUBE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://youtu.be/njg7Ee_jiyM
[https://perma.cc/2X7W-7K4F].
36
Id. Costar Michael Stuhlbarg praised this creative choice from Chalamet in
the commentary. Id.
37
Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound
Technology: Looking Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 7–8 (2014). In essence, the practice of creating music encompassed
both the writing stage and the playing or performing stage. Id.
38
Id. at 8.
39
Id.
33
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contributors themselves.40 Indeed, the Copyright Office’s policies
reflected this belief, as “[f]rom 1790 through 1977, federal copyright protection for musical compositions could be obtained only
through fixation in, and publication of, musical scores.”41
Today, the creation of musical pieces no longer revolves
around a written score.42 Indeed, “an analysis” conducted by
Robert Brauneis “of more than 4.5 million musical work copyright registrations at the U.S. Copyright Office from 1978
through 2012” reflects this trend.43 In his analysis, Brauneis
found that, during the period covered by his study, the percentage of musical work registrations that included notations
dropped from eighty-six percent to seventeen percent for unpublished musical works, and from eighty-six percent to twentyseven percent for published works.44

40

Cf. id. at 10 (“As Elijah Wald put it, what became popular for a few months in
the late 1800s and early 1900s was not a particular recording, but a song . . . .”)
(citing ELIJAH WALD, HOW THE BEATLES DESTROYED ROCK ‘N’ ROLL: AN
ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC 87 (2009)).
41
Id. at 12.
42
Id. at 28.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 29.
In 1978, [eighty-six percent] of musical works registered were accompanied
by deposits of notation and only [fourteen percent] by phonorecord deposits.
By 2012, [seventy-seven percent] of musical work registrations were accompanied by phonorecord deposits and only [seventeen percent] by deposits of
musical notation ([six percent] were accompanied only by deposits of text—
lyrics—and hence technically were not musical works).
Id. at 28.
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Figure: Musical Work Copyright Registrations, 1978–2012
Deposits and Types45
Indeed, in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress acknowledged
the changing nature of the music industry by permitting the
registration of phonorecords.46 This change recognized that, in
the modern era, there is often no prewritten composition, and
only an unwritten creative process from the musician.47 Further,
the 1976 Copyright Act preserved protections for sound recordings, which Congress had enacted in the Sound Recording Act of
1971.48 These protections had previously acknowledged that performances of composed works are creative endeavors in and of
themselves, separate and apart from the underlying composition.

45

Id. at 29.
Id. at 31. The 1976 Copyright Act permitted the limited copyright protection
of sound recordings, recognizing that performers also contribute greatly to musical
works. See id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 31–32. In 1994, Congress further expanded protections to musical
performers when it adopted the Anti-Bootlegging Act as part of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, which extended copyright protection to live performances, imposing
both civil, 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2018), and criminal, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2018), penalties for infringers—though the constitutionality of these provisions has been
questioned by courts. Andrew B. Peterson, Note, To Bootleg or Not to Bootleg?
Confusion Surrounding the Constitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Act Continues,
58 OKLA. L. REV. 723, 723–725, 723 n.2 (2005). Although the adoption of the antibootlegging provisions is emblematic of Congressional willingness to protect musical
performers, the provisions do not grant authorial protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101;
18 U.S.C. § 2319A.
46
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Thus, musicians are no longer seen as mere conduits for
prewritten compositions, but rather as active creators in the
musical process who operate in collaborative settings.49 Indeed,
musical performers may work with producers in recording a
work, or interpreting another’s composition in their own original
way, but either way, they often contribute creatively to the final
sound recording in a manner that is acknowledged under copyright law.50
4.

Three Different Collaborative Creations

In sum, photographic subjects, actors, and musicians all can
deliver lofty creative contributions to a work. All three kinds of
performers work in collaborative, creative endeavors, and all
three add creative elements to those endeavors.51 By way of examples addressed above, photographic subjects can add notoriety, expressions, and gestures to a piece; actors can provide
expression to the words of a script, improvise scenes and lines,
and bring films to life; and musicians can create melodies,
inflections, and creative interpretation to music.52
Thus, it is difficult to define bright lines of requisite
creativity by field. Indeed, the creative contribution of a performer will largely depend not on the industry, but rather on the
particular creative work. For example, a photographic subject’s
contribution may be greater in cases where the subject is given
great latitude to select the setting of the photo, the pose, or the
light, but lesser where the photographer has carefully curated
the setting, dictated the pose, or otherwise directed the captured
photo. Likewise, an actor’s creative labor may be greater where
he or she is permitted to improvise lines or independently make
choices about performance details or character attributes. However, where an actor is given very little discretion to make these
kinds of decisions—and is more closely guided by a director—his
or her creative labor may be significantly reduced. Similarly, a
musical performer may contribute more creative labor to a work
where the producer merely records the musician’s performance

49
See MELVILE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 11 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 803.3
(2017) (addressing the collaboration between producers and performers).
50
Id. § 803.5. Moreover, recording a musical performance can include not only a
singular performer, but also a band, and a producer. Id. § 803.3(A)–(B).
51
See discussion supra Sections I.A.1–3.
52
See id.
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without adding much, but less where a producer is playing a
larger role in editing or adding to the performance.
However, as addressed below, the law does not effectively
recognize these nuances.53 Rather, the law distinguishes among
the three groups discussed above by offering greater authorial
protection to musical performers than to similarly creative
photographic subjects and actors.
B. Existing Copyright Law Surrounding Authorship of Works
1.

Photography

The weight of precedent suggests that as a default rule,
photographic subjects cannot exert authorial rights over a photograph that they are featured in.54 In this context, authorship,
and therefore copyright, of the photograph is attributed to the
photographer.55
As briefly highlighted above, the Supreme Court addressed
the question of who qualifies as the author of a photograph as
early as 1884.56 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the
Court confronted the authorship of a picture taken by Napoleon
Sarony of Oscar Wilde.57 Ultimately, the Court determined that
the proper author of the photograph was Sarony, because much
of the artistic vision came from Sarony’s “mental conception.”58
Yet, despite this determination, the Court failed to address
whether or not Wilde had contributed authorial creativity.59

53

See infra Section I.B.
See generally Subotnik, supra note 15. Subotnik’s Article outlines various
cases and details the authorship doctrine for photographs. Id.
55
See id. at 449.
56
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884).
57
Id. at 54–55.
58
Id. at 60. The Court noted that the photograph was made
entirely from [Sarony’s] own original mental conception, to which he gave
visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting
and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said
photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the
desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.
Id.
59
Subotnik, supra note 15, at 452. Subotnik posits that “perhaps the Supreme
Court’s failure to engage with Wilde’s possible authorial contributions is due to” the
simple reason that “Sarony and Wilde had a contract in place.” Id.
54
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This decision was soon thereafter interpreted by several
cases involving the photographer Benjamin Falk.60 In these cases,
the old Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York denied
authorial protection to photographic subjects.61 However, in Press
Publishing Co. v. Falk, the court distinguished the context of a
consumer paying for a photograph, where ownership of the rights
in the photograph would lie with the paying consumer, and the
context of “a person submit[ting] himself or herself as a public
character, to a photographer,” where ownership of the copyright
would lie with the photographer.62
This approach has largely persisted.63 Further, the copyright
protection for photographic subjects who contract to have their
photograph taken was not codified in the list of works under the
work for hire provision of the 1976 Copyright Act.64 Even more
colorfully, in the 1989 case, Olan Mills, Inc. v. Eckerd Drug of
Texas, Inc., the court concluded that “[t]he simple fact that an
individual brings his own image to the studio is not enough to
give that person a protectable property right in the portrait.”65
This case and others like it appear to reject that a photographic
subject could be a joint author of a photograph.66
For example, in Janik v. SMG Media, Inc., the Southern
District of New York held that a photo of Spin Magazine founder
Bob Guccione Jr. was solely authored by the photographer.67 The
court stated that the simple choice of the subject to be photographed does not convey joint authorship to that subject.68
Further, the court stated that it was “doubtful” that Guccione
60

Id. at 452–58 (citing Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., 48 F. 678 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1891); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893); Press Publ’g Co. v. Falk, 59
F. 324 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894)).
61
See Brett Lithographing Co., 48 F. at 679; Donaldson, 57 F. at 33–34; Press
Publ’g Co., 59 F. at 325–26.
62
Press Publ’g Co., 59 F. at 325–26.
63
Subotnik, supra note 15, at 458. Subotnik notes that the analysis was largely
about ownership, and not precisely authorship. Id. She further notes that some
courts acknowledged the rights of photographic subjects who paid to be
photographed, or had serious privacy interests in ownership of the photographs. Id.
64
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
65
No. CA3-88-0333-D, 1989 WL 90605, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 1989).
66
Id.; see also Janik v. SMG Media, Inc., 16 Civ. 7308 (JGK) (AJP), 2018 WL
345111, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2018). A “joint work” is defined as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101; see
also infra Section II.B.
67
Janik, 2018 WL 345111, at *8.
68
Id. at *8 n.5.

280

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:269

had contributed copyrightable creativity in the photograph.69
Indeed, even Guccione’s choice “to stick out his tongue” was held
to be an insufficient creative contribution to establish any authorship over that photograph.70
Thus, the law has historically failed to—and continues to fail
to—offer significant authorial protections for photograph subjects
despite the creative labor photographic subjects can add to a
photograph.71
2.

Film

Courts have rarely addressed the issue of the authorship
rights of actors.72 When it has been addressed, courts have expressed only narrow circumstances where an actor may have an
authorial interest in a work.73 These narrow circumstances include Peter Seller’s contribution to The Pink Panther74 and a
group of actors from a Puerto Rican television show.75 The question of whether actors can assert authorial rights over their
creative contributions came to a climax in the controversial
Ninth Circuit decision Garcia v. Google, Inc.76
In 2011, actress Cindy Lee Garcia filmed a part for what she
was told was “an action-adventure thriller set in ancient Arabia,”
entitled Desert Warrior.77 Her role consisted of two sentences, for
which she was paid $500.78 Desert Warrior was never actually
released.79 Instead, the director used the scenes that had been
filmed under the pretense of filming Desert Warrior to manufac-

69

Id. at *8.
Id. at *8 n.5.
71
See supra Section I.A.1.
72
Hughes, supra note 4, at 16.
73
Id. at 21–22; see also Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d
962, 970 (9th Cir. 2008); TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 F. Supp.
2d 228, 236 (D.P.R. 2007).
74
See Richlin, 531 F.3d at 964, 970.
75
See TMTV Corp., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 230. TMTV sued Pegasus Broadcasting
for creating a show with some of the same actors playing identical or similar
characters to a show TMTV had created earlier; however, the court denied TMTV’s
motion for summary judgment on the basis that there was a “reasonable inference”
that in portraying the characters, the actors contributed creatively to the original
characters so as to make the actors authors. Id. at 236.
76
786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
77
Id. at 737.
78
Id. Garcia’s part was to “seem[ ] concerned” while saying, “Is George crazy?
Our daughter is but a child?” Id. (alteration in original).
79
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786
F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
70
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ture an offensive, fourteen-minute trailer for a film entitled
Innocence of Muslims.80 While the trailer included Garcia’s image,
her lines were dubbed “so that she appeared to be asking, ‘Is your
Mohammed a child molester?’ ”81 In 2012, that trailer was released on YouTube to protests and violence.82 Garcia received death
threats, notably from a fatwa issued by an Egyptian cleric urging
“Muslim Youth in America[ ]” to kill those involved in making the
film.83
Garcia sued to have the film removed from YouTube, asserting that she had a copyright interest in her performance.84 The
district court declined to award a preliminary injunction on the
grounds that Garcia had not established a likelihood of success
on the merits on her claim of authorship of her performance.85
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, acknowledging that “Garcia
may have [acquired] a copyright interest in her performance.”86
This opinion was met with criticism and in late 2014, the
Ninth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc.87 Upon rehearing, the court issued an opinion rejecting Garcia’s copyright
claim.88 The court based its reasoning largely on policy concerns.89
In essence, the court feared that awarding authorial rights to actors and actresses would result in awarding a copyright interest
to the “cast of thousands,” which would result in a “logistical and
financial nightmare” for the film industry.90 Though the decision
will likely not have far-reaching effects on the film industry
because of the contractual nature of authorship rights, its
80

Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737. This film is grossly offensive to people of the Muslim
faith, as it “depicts the Prophet Mohammed as, among other things, a murderer,
pedophile, and homosexual.” Id.
81
Id. at 932.
82
Id. at 737–38; see also, e.g., Orla Guerin, Deadly Film Protests in Pakistan,
BBC (Sep. 21, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-19671703/deadly-filmprotests-in-pakistan [https://perma.cc/3LB9-HD2C]. The film was also even
“purported[ly]” related to the 2012 “attack on the United States Consulate in
Benghazi, Libya.” Garcia, 786 F.3d at 738.
83
Garcia, 786 F.3d at 738 (alteration in original).
84
Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV 12-08315, 2012 WL 12878355, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
30, 2012), rev’d sub nom. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en
banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
85
Id. at *1.
86
Garcia, 766 F.3d at 935, 940 (emphasis added). Though the dissent did not
agree that Garcia could establish exclusive authorship, it seemed to suggest that Garcia
could well be a joint author based on her acting. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 25.
87
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647, 647 (9th Cir. 2014).
88
Garcia, 786 F.3d at 747.
89
Id. at 742–43.
90
Id.
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holding has essentially obliterated any possibility of authorial
rights of actors in their creative contributions to works.91
3.

Music

The law surrounding the authorship rights of musicians in
sound recordings is far more permissive. Indeed, the leading
copyright treatise, the legislative history to the 1976 Copyright
Act, and the copyright office have recognized that, in works of
sound recording, the producer and the performer contribute
copyrightable creativity.92
The influential treatise Nimmer on Copyright outlines that,
for sound recordings, there are two types of authorship:
“[a]uthorship in the performance[ ]” and “[a]uthorship in the
production.”93 Authorship in the production “include[s] capturing
and manipulating sounds and compiling and editing those
sounds to make a final recording.”94 These activities serve to recognize the creative labor of producers of sound recordings.95 On
the other hand, authorship in the performance “include[s] playing an instrument, singing, or speaking, or creating other sounds
which are captured and fixed in the sound recording. Individual
performance authorship may be claimed only if the sound
recording is comprised solely of an individual performance that is
sufficiently creative.”96 This type of authorship validates the
creative labor of musical performers.97

91

See 2 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2018, at 606 (2018)
(“This decision is unlikely to have a significant effect on filmmaking since motion
pictures are among the works eligible for work-made-for-hire status and studios
routinely require actors to execute work-made-for-hire agreements. . . . Nonetheless,
the decision negates actors’ claims to copyright in film projects.”). However, in 16
Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, the Second Circuit, relying on the Garcia decision, found
that a director’s contribution to a film did not constitute a work of authorship and
thus did not vest a copyrightable interest in that film to the director. 791 F.3d 247,
258–59 (2d Cir. 2015).
92
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.3; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669; Circular 56: Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 1, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/
circ56.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ5K-QRYT] (last updated Mar. 2019).
93
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.3.
94
Id. § 803.3(B).
95
Id. § 803.3.
96
Id. § 803.3(A).
97
See id.; see also supra Section I.A.3.
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According to Nimmer, based on the combination of creative
labor in play, the law recognizes that
[g]enerally, both the performer and the producer of a sound
recording of a musical performance or spoken word performance
contribute copyrightable authorship to the sound recording. In
some cases, however, the main or sole contribution may be
production authorship (as in a recording of bird songs, where
there is no human performance) or the main contribution may
be performance authorship (as in a recorded performance where
the only production involved is to push the “record” button).98

This position serves to recognize that each creative work at issue
will involve a collaboration of creative labor, and that the degree
to which a performer or producer contributes creative labor into
that particular work is relevant to determine authorship.99
However, they often share in authorship as joint authors.100
Similarly, the House Report to the 1976 Copyright Act
recognized that a musical performer could assert authorship over
a sound recording.101 Moreover, as recently as 2019, the Copyright Office, in its circular on the registration of sound
recordings, endorsed the view that musical performers can have
authorship over sound recordings.102 The circular states that
“[t]he author of a sound recording is the performer featured in
the recording and the producer who captured and processed the
sounds that appear in the final recording.”103 Therefore, in this
context, there appears to be an increased validation of a performer’s right to authorship over his or her creative contributions
to a work, to some degree.
98

NIMMER. & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.3.
Id.
100
Id. § 803.8(B). See discussion infra Section II.B.
101
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5669.
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though
not always, involve “authorship” both on the part of the performers whose
performance is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible
for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing
the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound
recording. There may, however, be cases where the record producer’s
contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable
element in the work, and there may be cases (for example, recordings of
birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only the record producer’s
contribution is copyrightable.
Id.
102
Circular 56, supra note 92, at 3.
103
Id.
99
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C. Why Protect Performers Anyway?
Modern copyright jurisprudence largely treats copyright protection as a utilitarian effort to increase “economic efficiency.”104
However, “this vision alone cannot adequately guide the development of copyright law.”105 Indeed, it would be remiss to ignore
the “unmistakable” factor of authors’ natural law rights,106 namely, “that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own
ingenuity and labour.”107 Indeed, though modern copyright law
tends to view protection as a means for serving the public
interest in receiving creative works, it also serves to give authors
the fruits of their labor.108
Moreover, “[t]he appropriateness of this reference to natural
law becomes even more clear when one considers the fact that
copyright law protects works for which no economic incentive is
required to induce creation.”109 Further, vindicating the rights of
performances is consistent with the utilitarian underpinnings of
intellectual property law because it incentivizes the creative
labor created by performers.110

104

Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and
Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 (1990).
105
Id. at 519.
106
Id. at 521.
107
Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2398 (KB), overruled by Donaldson v.
Becket (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (HL).
108
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657 (1834).
109
Yen, supra note 104, at 537. Yen cites protections for “works authored by
students to fulfill academic requirements[,] results of accidents[,] and products
which the government requires public utilities to print.” Id. (footnotes omitted)
(citing Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951);
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir.
1985)). Further, Yen notes that
[i]f economic necessity were truly the only motivation for copyright, we
would remove copyright protection from these works and any others which
would be produced in the absence of copyright. Granting these works
copyright induces no economic gain. If anything, economic welfare would
increase if the public gained free access to these works through a denial of
copyright. Our reluctance to take such a course of action demonstrates the
natural law vindication of an author’s creation in our copyright law.
Id.
110
Further, the utilitarian objections to awarding performers increased authorial protection revolve around the problem of “The Cast of Thousands”; however, this
problem is minimized by the application of other copyright doctrines. See infra
Section III.C.
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Labor Rights to Creative Labor

The natural rights theory can be traced back to the Roman
natural law.111 Yet the “most famous proponent” of this view is
John Locke.112 Locke articulated that:
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to
all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this
nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body,
and the work of his hands we may say are properly his.
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.113

Thus, the central premise of the natural rights approach is that a
person is entitled to the product of his or her labor. Applying
Locke’s principles, a creative contributor should have a right to
his or her labor. This application, however, depends in part on
how broadly we define a creative contributor’s labor.
The law defines creative labor capaciously. To be copyrightable,
a work need only exhibit a “modicum of creativity.”114 Further,
courts largely should not “assess the artistic value of [a] work.”115
These low thresholds of a creator’s creative contributions suggest
that courts treat creative labor as labor, regardless of the depth
of that creativity, or the value contributed by that creativity.116
Thus, under a theory of natural rights, even a minority creative
contributor ought to be entitled to the fruits born from his or her
creative contribution.
2.

Personal Rights to Creative Labor

The personality theory of property, posited by Hegel, justifies
property as a form of self-expression.117 Though “the difference
between [Locke] and Hegel—at least as to the analysis of intel111

Yen, supra note 104, at 522.
Id. at 523.
113
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 27 (J.W.
Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1689).
114
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
115
Yen, supra note 104, at 533 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903)).
116
See id. at 536 (“Although our early notions of copyright were very limited,
copyright now protects nearly all creations of an author’s mind . . . .”). Yen also notes
further requirements of copyrightability outside of the initial originality
requirement at issue in our labor-focused analysis. Id. at 536–37.
117
See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
329 (1988).
112
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lectual property—may be minimal,” it is worth noting as an
alternative justification for protecting the rights of creators.118
Hegel’s theory of personhood proposes that persons are
“abstract unit[s] of free will.”119 Therefore, a person’s continuing
existence is premised on their ability to find “personal embodiment or self-constitution” in the form of “things” in the external
world.120 Consequently, because these “things” become constitutively linked to the person, we should afford that person the freedom to control that “thing.”121 This control is afforded in the form
of property rights.122
In the context of intellectual property, a person often invests
a great amount of his or her personhood into a work.123 This is
particularly the case for highly expressive works.124 Thus, a person becomes bound up in that work; that is, the work is linked to
that person’s self-constitution.125 Thus, a person should be given
a property right in that work to allow them to attain economic
and noneconomic recognition for their personhood interest in that
work.126 Accordingly, this supports the notion that performers, who
118
119

Id. at 330.
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 972

(1982).
120

Id. at 958.
Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of
themselves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood because
they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal
entities in the world. They may be as different as people are different, but
some common examples might be a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom,
or a house.
Id. at 959.
121
Id. at 958, 960.
122
See id. at 960.
123
Hughes, supra note 117, at 340. “Poems, stories, novels, and musical works
are clearly receptacles for personality. The same can be said for sculpture, paintings,
and prints.” Id. The performing industries this Note focuses on can be highly
expressive, as photographic subjects can identify with a photo taken of them, actors
can identify with a role or character, and musical performers can identify with their
rendition of a particular song.
124
Id. at 341. “We should be more willing to accord legal protection to the fruits
of highly expressive intellectual activities, such as the writing of novels, than to the
fruits of less expressive activities, such as genetic research.” William Fisher,
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 171 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 1st ed. 2001).
125
Hughes, supra note 117, at 340. This justifies a person’s “persona.” Id.
Though no labor is required to produce a “persona,” “[a]s long as a person identifies
with his personal image” he or she will have a Hegelian interest in that persona. Id.
at 340–41.
126
See id. at 350. “Authors and inventors should be permitted to earn respect,
honor, admiration, and money from the public by selling or giving away copies of
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invest so much of themselves—or to the degree they do so in any
work—be awarded copyright interests in a given work.
II. COPYRIGHT DOCTRINES RELEVANT TO
RESOLVE THE DISPARATE PROTECTION OF
PERFORMERS’ AUTHORIAL RIGHTS
A.

Work for Hire Doctrine

Under the Copyright Act, initial ownership of a copyright
vests “in the author or authors of the work.”127 This means that
“an individual who writes, composes, or paints an original work
of authorship on her or his own acquires the copyright upon the
work’s creation.”128 However, in the modern day works are often
produced in an employment context.129 Because of this reality,
the law has recognized authorial rights in employers in the work
for hire doctrine.130 A work is considered to be a “work made for
hire” if that work is
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as
a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.131

If a work meets this threshold, an “employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for the
purposes of [Title 17], and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”132
The second subsection expressly protects nine enumerated
types of works, including films, so long as there is a signed
their works, but should not be permitted to surrender their right to prevent others
from mutilating or misattributing their works.” Fisher, supra note 124, at 172.
127
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2018).
128
MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 91, at 587.
129
See id.
130
See id. at 587–88. This doctrine has been justified by the impact on reducing
transaction costs. Id. at 594. The doctrine attempts to prevent the potential problem
of having a contributor limit the commercialization of a possible work by acting as a
“holdout.” Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
131
17 U.S.C. § 101.
132
Id. § 201(b).
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written agreement stating that the work is a work for hire.133
However, this section is not applicable to photographs or sound
recordings per se.134 Though that subsection of the statutory text
offers a clear definition of when the work for hire doctrine applies
in certain works, the first subsection offers little instruction to
what is meant by “employee,” making the scope of its application
ambiguous.135 In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
the Supreme Court addressed this lack of instruction and
introduced a test to determine whether a creator is an “employee”
for the purposes of the work for hire doctrine.136
In that case, a sculptor agreed to build a sculpture for a
nonprofit organization that sought to end homelessness in
America.137 The agreement was not memorialized in writing, and
neither party addressed copyright.138 The sculptor completed and
delivered the statue and was paid $15,000 for the completed
statue; however, the statue was returned to the sculptor for
minor repairs.139 Later, the nonprofit sought to take the statue
on a tour around various cities to raise awareness for homelessness.140 The sculptor objected and refused to turn over the
statue, stating that the statue’s material would not tolerate the
rigors of a tour.141 The sculptor filed a certificate of copyright,
after which the nonprofit filed a competing certificate of copyright; in assessing their competing claims, the district court and
circuit court focused on whether the sculptor was an employee of
the nonprofit under 17 U.S.C. § 101(1).142
The Supreme Court determined that in assessing whether a
party is an “employee” for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 101(1), the
general common law rules of agency apply.143 Further, the Court
outlined that, under the law of agency, courts should look to
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished[;] . . . the skill required; the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. § 101(2).
See id.
See MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 91, at 588.
490 U.S. 730, 738–39 (1989).
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 735–36.
Id. at 740–41.
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work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.144

Applying this test, the Court determined that the sculptor was
the author of the sculpture.145 Notwithstanding that designer’s
particular outcome, the work for hire exception offers strong
copyright protection to employers, even outside of an express
agreement, sometimes, at the expense of creators or performers.
B. Joint Author Doctrine
A “joint work” is one “prepared by two or more authors with
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”146 Courts have interpreted this definition to additionally require that (1) each joint
author contribute work that is independently copyrightable, and
(2) both parties demonstrate an intention to be joint authors
when making such contributions.147
However, in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, the Ninth Circuit required that the person seeking authorship over the work control
the work.148 In that case, the Ninth Circuit denied a contributor
authorial rights in a Malcom X biopic based on his lack of “super-

144

Id. at 751–52.
Id. at 752–53. The Court pointed to the fact that sculpting requires a lot of
skill. Id. at 752. Further, the Court noted that the sculptor used his own tools and
studio; was unsupervised; only worked for the nonprofit for two months for a
singular task; and was not formally recognized as an employee for tax purposes. Id.
at 752–53.
146
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
147
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 1998); Aalmuhammed v.
Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Justin Hughes, Peter Menell, and David Nimmer in
Support of Neither Party at 12, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015)
(No. 12-57302); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (“Under the definition of section 101, a work is ‘joint’ if the
authors collaborated with each other, of [sic] if each of the authors prepared his or
her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the
contributions of other authors as ‘inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.’ ”).
148
202 F.3d at 1234–35.
145
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intendence” over the film.149 There, Aalmuhammed was hired to
work on the film, and he specifically reviewed the script and
suggested extensive revisions, some of which were included in
the final work.150 Further,
Aalmuhammed submitted evidence that he directed Denzel
Washington and other actors while on the set, created at least
two entire scenes with new characters, translated Arabic into
English for subtitles, supplied his own voice for voice-overs,
selected the proper prayers and religious practices for the
characters, and edited parts of the movie during post
production.151

Aalmuhammed was paid for his work, but when he sought
authorship recognition in the credits, he was rebuffed.152
Instead, he was listed in the credits as an “Islamic Technical
Consultant.”153 Aalmuhammed sued Spike Lee and the production companies seeking, in relevant part, a declaratory judgment
that the movie was a “joint work.”154 The court refused to give
Aalmuhammed that relief.155 The court reasoned that although
he had contributed significantly to the work, Aalmuhammed was
not a joint author because he did not “master mind” the work.156
Further, the court noted that the parties lacked the requisite
intent to form a joint author relationship.157

149

Id. at 1229, 1235.
Id. at 1229–30.
151
Id. at 1230.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 1235.
156
Id. (“Aalmuhammed offered no evidence that he was the ‘inventive or master
mind’ of the movie.”).
157
Id.
[N]either Aalmuhammed, nor Spike Lee, nor Warner Brothers, made any
objective manifestations of an intent to be coauthors. Warner Brothers
required Spike Lee to sign a “work for hire” agreement, so that even Lee
would not be a coauthor and co-owner with Warner Brothers. It would be
illogical to conclude that Warner Brothers, while not wanting to permit Lee
to own the copyright, intended to share ownership with individuals like
Aalmuhammed who worked under Lee’s control, especially ones who at the
time had made known no claim to the role of coauthor.
Id.
150
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C. Implied License Doctrine
In order to transfer an exclusive license in a copyright, there
must be a writing.158 Yet, “nonexclusive licenses may . . . be
granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.”159 To
create an implied license, “(1) a person (the licensee) requests the
creation of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that
particular work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it,
and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and
distribute his work.”160
III. A REFORMED JOINT AUTHORSHIP STANDARD
AS A VEHICLE TO EQUALIZE RIGHTS OF PERFORMERS
A.

Reforming the Joint Author Standard

Intellectual property scholars have questioned the Ninth
Circuit’s addition of the element of superintendence to the joint
author analysis in Aalmuhammed v. Lee.161 This is because the
superintendence requirement to establish joint authorship law
fundamentally ignores the collaborative nature of many performance industries.162
To recognize the collaborative nature of many performance
industries, courts should adopt the approach posited by
intellectual property scholar Justin Hughes.163 Namely, he argues
that courts remove the requirement of superintendence.164 Thus,
as Hughes has proposed, the standard should simply require that
(1) the authors each contribute copyrightable expression, and
158

Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990); 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 49, § 10.03(A)(1)(a).
159
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 10.03(A)(7), quoted with approval in
Effects Assocs., Inc., 908 F.2d at 558.
160
I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Effects Assocs.,
908 F.2d at 558–59).
161
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 147, at 13; see also Section II.B.
162
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 147, at 13-14. “The nature of a collaborative enterprise is such that at times different authors will exercise more control than
the others over the work. To require a contributor to exercise equal ‘inventive’ control in order to be a joint author is therefore unrealistic.” Id. (citation omitted); see
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1738
(2014).
163
Hughes, supra note 4, at 62, 64; see also Maria Solis, Lens of London:
Granting Limited Copyright Protection for Performers 1, 11 (Aug. 25, 2018) (unpublished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3306360 (advocating for the use of
joint authorship doctrine in motion pictures to permit actors to assert authorship
over their important contributions).
164
Hughes, supra note 4, at 61–62.
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(2) the parties prepare that contribution with the intention that
the work be merged inseparably.165 This should require a factsensitive analysis of the individual contributions each contributor made.
Copyrightable contributions require only a low level of
creativity.166 But the creativity required by this standard has
been disputed.167 While some scholars advocate for a requirement that each author contribute an individually copyrightable
work, others advocate for a standard requiring a contribution
that is merely not de minimis.168 However, requiring a strong
contribution would not be in line with precedent suggesting only
a “minimal degree of creativity” is required to secure copyright
protection, nor would it acknowledge the reality of creative
works.169 Thus, as Hughes argues, courts should not enforce a
strong originality requirement in order to find joint authorship of
a work.170
The second prong of Hughes’ proposed analysis might be
more fraught, since in the absence of a contract, it can be difficult
to determine the parties’ intentions.171 This prong turns on whether the parties intended, at the time the work was created, to
merge their contributions inseparably.172 While this seems easy
to determine, parties must also intend to be joint authors, and
not solely intend to merge their contributions.173 This prong would
require a fact-sensitive inquiry.
165

Id. at 59, 64.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
167
Hughes, supra note 4, at 59–60.
168
Id. This requirement will alleviate some of the concerns that plagued the
Ninth Circuit in Garcia and Aalmuhammed, since not every contributor of a work
will be able to assert ownership—only those who contribute enough.
169
Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345; see also Hughes, supra note 4, at 60–61
(“[A] strong ‘independently copyrightable contribution’ ” standard is specifically “incompatible with our common thinking about films. While the contribution of an actor
might be imagined, or even shot, in isolation, there is no original expression from a
film director or cinematographer that can be separated from what is done by other
contributors. Yet in many jurisdictions, film directors are presumed to be the
authors of audiovisual works.”) (footnotes omitted). But see Joseph Miller, Hoisting
Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 458 (2009) (arguing for a stronger standard for
originality in copyright).
170
Hughes, supra note 4, at 60.
171
See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000).
172
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5736.
173
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
The wording of the statutory definition appears to make relevant only the
state of mind regarding the unitary nature of the finished work—an
166
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Additionally, the law surrounding joint authorship “treats
joint authors as tenants-in-common.”174 This means that in most
cases, joint authors will share coequal ownership over the entire
work.175 Hughes suggests that this approach is flawed.176 Indeed,
he argues that “nothing in the Copyright Act requires that outcome and the legislative history indicates that that was not
Congress’s intent.”177
Accepting Hughes’ approach, common law principles should
guide a tenancy-in-common determination.178 And, at most, “the
common law has a rebuttable presumption of equal ownership
shares and that presumption is rebutted by clear evidence of
intent, unequal contribution, or other circumstances establishing
that equal ownership would be inappropriate.”179 This suggests
that, in the copyright context, courts should engage in a factual
inquiry to determine the extent of a party’s contribution to a
work to determine the extent of their authorship. This view
would be able to justly determine authorship given the collaborative nature of the creative industries.180 Thus, adopting a factintention “that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” However, an inquiry so limited would
extend joint author status to many persons who are not likely to have been
within the contemplation of Congress. . . . What distinguishes the writereditor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship from the true
joint author relationship is the lack of intent of both participants in the
venture to regard themselves as joint authors.
Id.
174

MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 91, at 607.
Id.
176
Hughes, supra note 4, at 64 (suggesting that this presumption has tainted
courts’ openness to award joint authorship rights based on the severe relief granted
to a joint author).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 65.
179
Id.
180
Currently, the law around musicians recognizes that creative contributions
can come in different degrees, and thus ownership should be treated accordingly.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.3 (“In some cases, however, the main or
sole contribution may be production authorship (as in a recording of bird songs,
where there is no human performance) or the main contribution may be performance
authorship (as in a recorded performance where the only production involved is to
push the ‘record’ button).”).
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though
not always, involve “authorship” both on the part of the performers whose
performance is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible
for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing
the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound
recording. There may, however, be cases where the record producer’s
contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable
175

294

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:269

sensitive approach of authorship would not only comport with
common law principles surrounding tenancy-in-common,181 but
also acknowledge the individual creative labors of specific works,
since awarding authorship for the relative creative labor of the
parties would validate each party’s creative labor.
B. The Reformed Joint Author Standard as an Equalizer
The photography, film, and music industries are all collaborative in nature.182 Yet, the law only recognizes the joint
authorship of musical performers.183 This leaves performers in
the similarly collaborative industries of photography and acting
without access to similar protection.184 Applying Hughes’ joint
authorship standard would correct this disparity in protection
and afford a viable opportunity for joint authorship to photographic subjects and actors.
The first requirement of Hughes’ joint authorship standard
requires that each party makes at least a non–de minimis
contribution.185 Performers in the photography, film, and music
industries all have the potential to contribute non–de minimis
creative labor—that is, some “minimal degree of creativity.”186
For example, photographic subjects can spontaneously and creatively add value to a photograph in a way not imagined or
intended by the photographer.187 Likewise, actors can create
strong, realistic characters and produce emotional connections
with the audience.188 Finally, musicians create their own songs
or perform pre-composed songs in an original and novel way.189

element in the work, and there may be cases (for example, recordings of
birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, et cetera) where only the record producer’s
contribution is copyrightable.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669.
However, the photography and film industries likewise are industries based on varying degrees of creative contributions. See supra Section I.A.
181
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121.
182
See supra Section I.A; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56.
183
See supra Section I.B.3. Indeed, the foundation of musical performers’ increased protection stems from Congress’ recognition of the collaborative nature of
the music industry, and of the relevant creative labor expended by performers in
that industry. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56.
184
See supra Sections I.B.1–2.
185
See supra Section III.A.
186
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
187
See supra Section I.A.1.
188
See supra Section I.A.2.
189
See supra Section I.A.3.
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Next, the parties must intend to merge their contributions
inseparably.190 While this seems simple to assert,191 parties must
also intend to be joint authors, and not solely intend to merge
their contributions.192 This will be a fact-sensitive inquiry, but
there is nothing that would prohibit a performer and a producer
or other putative author from having the requisite intent to be
joint authors. Indeed, in the field of sound recordings, musicians
and producers generally intend to be joint authors.193 This reflects the natural intuition that a reasonable person, all things
being equal, would intend to maintain authorship over their
contribution to a work.194 Thus, absent a contrary indication, a
reasonable performer would likely intend to maintain authorial
rights in his or her contributions.
And, finally, courts should engage in an analysis into the relative contributions of joint authors, in order to award authorial
shares that are equitable in the circumstances.195 Under this
reformed standard, authorship rights of photographic subjects
and actors would be elevated to approximate the protections
already afforded to musical performers. This reformed standard
would account for their labor rights in their creative contri190

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,

5736.
191

A photographic subject plainly intends to have his or her image and any
creativity “merged” into the final photograph, an actor clearly intends to have his or
her performance “merged” into the final film, and a musical performer certainly
expects that his or her performance will be “merged” onto the final sound recording.
192
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
The wording of the statutory definition appears to make relevant only the
state of mind regarding the unitary nature of the finished work—an
intention “that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” However, an inquiry so limited
would extend joint author status to many persons who are not likely to
have been within the contemplation of Congress. . . . What distinguishes
the writer-editor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship from
the true joint author relationship is the lack of intent of both participants
in the venture to regard themselves as joint authors.
Id.
193
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.8(B). “Generally, where there are
multiple authors of a sound recording, the sound recording is a joint work and the
applicant should name all the authors of that work. In such cases, the authors’
contributions are not subject to separate registrations.” Id. (emphasis added).
194
Hughes notes that, in the context of actors, “[g]iven all that dramatic
performers think about their craft, it seems unlikely that the actor would think she
is not an author.” Hughes, supra note 4, at 64.
195
Hughes, supra note 4, at 59–60. Though, admittedly, this would require a
tremendous amount of court resources, it would allow for a more equitable system of
copyright protection.
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butions by acknowledging their copyrightable contributions in a
particular work, allowing for their intent to preserve ownership
over those contributions and permitting them to assert authorship of those contributions.
C. Taking on “The Cast of Thousands”
The predominant policy concern guiding the Ninth Circuit in
its decision to deny authorial rights in performance to Cindy
Garcia is illustrative of possibly the biggest utilitarian concern
about awarding performers rights in works. This is the fear of
awarding authorship rights to “the proverbial ‘cast of thousands,’ ” that is, works with many contributors.196
This concern is rooted in the utilitarian goal of copyright law
to “foster[ ] . . . the optimal use and dissemination of [literary and
artistic] works.”197 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit expressed concern
that “[t]reating every acting performance as an independent work
would not only be a logistical and financial nightmare, it would
turn cast of thousands into a new mantra: copyright of thousands.”198 Though that case dealt with the film industry, this
same concern extends into the other industries discussed above.
For example, the same problem may arise for photographs with
multiple subjects, or sound recordings with several band
members. Yet, in the latter scenario, the law unequivocally
protects the individual authorial rights of creative contributors,199 and fairness dictates equal treatment across media.
Despite the threat of the “copyright of thousands,” it need not be
a foregone conclusion that offering performers protection will
truly lead to this feared result.200 Indeed, as Hughes described,
“worrying about ‘copyright of thousands’ in audiovisual works is
like worrying about snow in South Florida.”201

196

Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015).
MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 91, at 500.
198
Garcia, 786 F.3d at 743.
199
NIMMER &NIMMER, supra note 49, § 803.8(B) (“a recording of a song might be
jointly authored by the members of a band, or a singer”).
200
Hughes, supra note 4, at 51.
201
Id. (footnote omitted).
197
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Contractual Protections

In the film and music industries, the work for hire doctrine
reigns.202 Indeed, in the film industry, performances are “almost
always governed” by contracts, which establish the authorial
rights in the producers.203 In the realm of photography, the contractual provision of the work for hire protections does not
apply.204 However, some courts have recognized a quasi–work for
hire doctrine in the recognition of ownership rights for consumers
who pay to be photographed.205 And indeed, the general provisions of assignment contracts remain a source for contractually
asserting rights.206 Yet, performers remain in fairly weak bargaining positions.207 Thus, “most performers are unable to obtain
significant rights beyond the minimums guaranteed by collective
bargaining agreements.”208
Given this context, particularly in the film industry where
work for hire principles apply and contracts are almost always
made to privately organize authorship rights, protecting the
rights of performers is unlikely to have uproarious repercussions.
Indeed, awarding authorial rights to performers may increase
producers’ initiative to clearly delineate authorship rights privately via contract. Further, awarding creative contributors authorial rights as a default rule may actually serve to increase the
bargaining power of performers. This may lead to a more leveled
negotiating table—and fairer agreements—when parties engage
in contractually organizing rights.
Further, if the work for hire doctrine fails to award full
ownership to an employer or commissioning party, there remains
a further contractual doctrine to halt the performer’s assertion of

202
Id. at 53–54; Mary LaFrance, Are We Serious About Performers’ Rights?, 5 IP
THEORY 81, 83 (2015). These agreements often provide minimal rights because of the
performers’ relatively weak bargaining positions. LaFrance, supra, at 81–83.
203
Hughes, supra note 4, at 51. Indeed, “performers’ economic and moral rights
in the works they help to create depend almost entirely on the contracts they
negotiate with producers.” LaFrance, supra note 202.
204
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
205
See supra Section I.A; Subotnik, supra note 15, at 458. Subotnik points out
that this was based on a presumed assignment of rights from the photographer to
the subject. Subotnik, supra note 15, at 458.
206
17 U.S.C. § 204.
207
LaFrance, supra note 202.
208
Id. These minimum protections are even further diminished in nonunionized
contexts.
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authorship. This is the “two” in the “one-two punch” for ensuring
that producers retain unfettered control over a work: implied
licenses.209
Thus, an implied license would exist where
the film producer [or photographer] requests the performance;
the actor [or photographic subject] gives the performance [or
sits for the photograph] and delivers it while authorizing its
fixation by the film producer [or photographer]; and the actor
[or photographic subject] intends that the film producer [or
photographer] copy and distribute the performance [or
photograph].210

This, too, will serve to prevent creative contributors from asserting certain holdout postures based on claimed authorship over
works and thus prevent the “cast of thousands.” Indeed, this doctrine may even govern the above examples regarding Johnny
Cash and Timothée Chalamet—absent any contracts. Marshall
sought to photograph Cash, Cash allowed Marshall to photograph him, and Cash likely knew, and intended, that Marshall
was going to distribute that photograph of him. Chalamet was
hired to play Elio in Call Me by Your Name, he allowed the
producer to record his performance, and intended for the movie,
and thus his performance, to be distributed.
2.

De Minimis Contributions

In order to get copyright protection, a work must have a
non–de minimis amount of creativity.211 Indeed, where a copyright application lists multiple authors, all must make non–de
minimis contributions.212 This requirement will also serve to limit
the risk of the “cast of thousands.” In the context of film, Hughes
observed:
In normal circumstances, the best boy—an assistant to an electrician on a film crew—would not contribute any original
expression to the film. It is the same with an extra in a crowded

209

Hughes, supra note 4, at 55.
Id. at 56.
211
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991).
212
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 618.8(D)(3). “If two or more authors are
named in the application, and if it appears that one of the authors contributed de
minimis authorship to the work, the specialist will ask for permission to remove that
author’s information from the registration record.” Id.
210
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marketplace or battle scene: they probably contribute no original expression and, if they do, unauthorized reproduction would
likely be de minimis.213

In the context of photography, the doctrine likewise applies.214
Thus, where a photographic subject only provides the de minimis
creative contribution of merely being in a photograph, he or she
will fail to assert any authorship over that photograph. Thus,
this doctrine would also function as an effective tool in preventing the feared “cast of thousands,” as actors and photographic
subjects who fail to exhibit the “modicum of creativity” required
for copyright protection will be prohibited from asserting
authorship in the work.215
D. Treaty Aspects
Given the difficulty performers can face in seeking authorship recognition in a work,216 treaties may offer performers
certain rights outside of authorship to reward their creative labor
to some extent. “Compared to treaties addressing authors’ rights,
international agreements on performers’ rights are relatively
recent developments.”217 Indeed, the 1886 signing of the Berne
Convention marked the first multilateral agreement with regard
to authors’ rights.218 Yet multilateral treaties only addressed
performers’ rights starting in 1961, with the signing of the Rome
Convention, which the United States has not joined, and which
afforded “performers the right to prevent unauthorized broadcasting and recording of their live performances.”219
In 1994, the United States joined a treaty recognizing performers’ rights for the first time.220 This shift came with the
enactment of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel213

Hughes, supra note 4, at 52 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Tang v. Putruss, 521 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
215
Arguably, this “cast of thousands” may only come after possibly expensive
litigation, or threat thereof.
216
LaFrance, supra note 202.
217
Id. at 86.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 86.
In the case of sound recordings, performers could also prevent reproductions of recordings that exceeded the scope of their original consent. While
the treaty also recognized a performance right in sound recordings, this
right was limited to equitable remuneration payable to either the producer
or the performers; the allocation was left up to the signatory countries.
Id. at 86–87 (footnotes omitted).
220
Id. at 87.
214
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lectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), which “requires signatories to
recognize performers’ rights to prevent the unauthorized
recording of their live performances in ‘phonograms’ as well as
any reproductions of those unauthorized recordings.”221 This led
to the enactment of anti-bootlegging provisions, which impose
civil and criminal penalties on those who reproduce live performances without authorization, in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act.222
Additionally, in 1996, the United States signed WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”).223 This treaty
requires that signatories recognize an extensive range of
performers’ moral and economic rights.224 Yet, this “has had no
effects on performers’ rights under [United States] law.”225 Most
recently, in 2012, the United States signed the Beijing Agreement.226 The Beijing Agreement seeks to recognize the moral and
economic rights of audiovisual performers, similar to what the
WPPT sought to accomplish for sound recording performances.227
In the face of these treaties, Congress is faced with changing
copyright law in order to comply with the treaties’ requirements to
recognize performers’ moral and economic rights.228 Thus, “[t]aking
performers [sic] rights seriously is not an option; it is a
necessity.”229
221

Id.
Id. at 82 & n.8, 87–88.
223
Id. at 88.
224
Id. “Many of [WPPT’s] provisions, however, apply only to performers on
sound recordings.” Id.
225
Id. at 89 (“For instance, as was true prior to the WPPT, recording artists can
assert rights of attribution and integrity over their recorded material only if they reserve these rights in their contracts with producers. While recording contracts
typically call for performers to be credited on their recordings, certain forms of exploitation may be excluded. Similar limits apply to integrity rights; because the
record company owns the copyright in the recording, typically, a performer can
prevent alteration of the work only by negotiating for this right in the recording
contract.”).
226
WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=841 (last visited Oct. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
YG4V-FYCK]. The treaty has not yet been ratified. Id.
227
LaFrance, supra note 202, at 89–90.
228
Id. at 91 (“To comply with the treaties, Congress would have to adopt specific
moral rights legislation for performers that is at least comparable to the protections
that [current law] extends to the authors of works of visual art.”).
229
Id. at 92 (“The United States must also address performers’ rights in order to
comply with our current international treaty obligations, as well as the new
obligations that will arise when [the] Beijing [Agreement] enters into force. Yet
Congress has made no effort to implement WPPT, raising doubts as to future
compliance with [the] Beijing [Agreement].”).
222
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CONCLUSION
Protecting the fruits of performers’ creative endeavors is
paramount. In 1972, Congress recognized this reality in its limited protection of sound recordings.230 This crucial move served to
partly vindicate the creative labor of musical performers and
entitled them to some of the fruits borne out of their creative
labor. Yet, copyright law more generally continues to ignore the
labor rights of performers in other fields; notably, in the fields of
photography and film. This does not have to persist. Indeed, the
law may already have an avenue to equalize the rights of
different performers via the doctrine of joint authorship, as an
expansive reading of that doctrine would serve to honor the
creative contributions of performers and equalize the rights of
creative contributors across media. Thus, courts should adopt a
broader view of joint authorship and stop perpetuating the
inequality among performers of different industries.

230
This was through the passage of the Sound Recording Act of 1972, preserved
in the 1976 Copyright Act.

